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Paying for goods or services by credit cards is becoming more extended. This fact 
can be accepted very positively. According to the European Commission, however,  
the  payment  services market remains very fragmented and inconsistent among 
other things due to the fact that they are used on the card issuers or as well as its 
processors interchange fees.  Therefore,  the  European Commission carried out to  
issue  a  proposal Regulation  on  the interchange  fees,  which complements an  
amendment to the Directive on payment services in the internal EU market. The 
Commission's  proposal is  including the  introduction  of a  maximum amount  of 
interchange fees for debit and credit payment card.
This  paper will deal  with  the  issue whether the  proposal of  pan-European 
regulation can be seen as a positive step for the development of the payments made 
by  credit  card or  not. It  will  further  include assess  of  the  impact  of upcoming 
regulation on the individual market
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The habits relating to purchases of goods and services have recently been 
significantly  changing,  both globally  and on the  European level.  For  ex-
ample,  online  payments,  payments  via  mobile  phones  or  payments  by 
means of one of the most widespread payment instruments – a payment 
card – have all represented dramatic changes. According to information of 
the  European  Commission  (hereinafter  the  “EC”),  nearly  every  account 
holder possesses a payment card in the form of a debit card, with 40 percent 
of people also having a credit card. In total, 34 percent of EU citizens shop 
online and 50 percent of people already use a smartphones, which allow 
them to execute payment services in other than paper form1. However, in 
spite of all efforts on the part of the EC or the private SEPA2 project, the 
European payment service market continues, for the time being, to be frag-
mented  and  quite  heterogeneous.  The  project  results  implementation  is 
slow, even though the EC published generally binding legal regulations in 
support of its implementation, such as – for example - Regulation (EU) No. 
260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 
establishing  technical  and business  requirements  for  credit  transfers  and 
direct debits in euro or Regulation (EC) No. 924/2009 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on cross-border payments 
in the Community, and annulment of Regulation (EC) No. 2560/2001. The 
EC is convinced that the establishment of a functional internal payment ser-
vices market is mainly prevented by different costs of payments for con-
sumers and retailers (merchants), differences in technical infrastructure of 
banks or inability of payment card issuers, for example, to agree on the im-
plementation of common technical standards. These barriers then, the EC 
believes, slow down the economic development of the relevant countries 
and of the Community, reducing their growth potential. According to the 
EC, the commercial model of the so-called “interchange fees” (see below) 
also represents a significant barrier for the development of a single payment 
1 See, for example, the material “Evropská regulace platebních služeb a její dopady na ČR”,  
EU- Media, s. r. o. Prague. 2013, p. 1 (“European Regulation of Payment Services and its Im-
pact on the Czech Republic”). 
2 SEPA – Single European Payment Area. It is a private-law regulation project in the area of  
provision of payment services for domestic and cross-border payments, currently suppor-
ted by the EC and the European Central Bank (ECB). The key objective of the project is the  
provision of selected cross-border payment services under the same economic and techno-
logical terms and conditions as such payment services are being provided on a national 
level. For example, compare SCHLOSSBERGER, O.: “Platební služby”, Management Press. 
Prague, 2012, pp. 257 - 293. ISBN 978-80-7261-238-3 (“Payment services”).
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market. The EC is certain that the model promotes high inter-bank fees (or 
between card issuers and card-based transaction processors, as appropriate) 
and affects the costs of retailers, who then reflect such fees in their prices,  
predominantly paid by consumers (as end users of payment cards). 
2. REGULATORY DEFINITION AND INTERCHANGE FEE 
The European Union (hereinafter the “EU”) authorities started to deal with 
the  issue  of  payment  services  in  the  EU  internal  market  around  2005 
already. Two years later, Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council was adopted, the objective of which was to introduce a 
harmonized legal framework for payment services. Consequently, individu-
al member states were forced to implement the Directive in their respective 
national laws, which in fact occurred by October of 2009. To ensure further 
support, the above mentioned Regulations were adopted. As already men-
tioned, the way consumers purchase their goods and services has been sub-
ject to relatively rapid development since the implementation of the Direct-
ive, reflected in Act no. 284/2009 Coll., on System of payments, in the Czech 
Republic. For example, payment cards have become a standard part of daily 
life, whereas more and more people – as users – are getting used to making 
their payments online or via mobile phones. However, the EC decided to re-
act to the changing situation on the market of payment instrument, publish-
ing the so-called Green Paper in January 20123. The aforementioned Green 
Paper documented and explained certain barriers preventing the develop-
ment of a fully integrated payment market. The material was followed by a 
proposal  for  revision  of  the  wording  of  the  Payment  Services  Directive, 
which was – together with the Regulation on Interchange Fees – published 
in July 20134. Prior to listing the reasons that led the EC to the decision to 
newly regulate the level of interbank (interchange) fees as well as potential  
impacts of such regulation on various market segment and participants, it is 
necessary to define the characteristics of such fees. 
Interchange fees refer to an amount paid by a retailer to an issuing bank 
(issuer) via a processing bank (acquirer) from a processed card-based trans-
3 Green Paper - Towards an integrated European market for card, internet and mobile pay-
ments,  European  Commission,  January  2012.  Available  at: 
http://www.cnb.cz/cs/platebni_styk/pravni_predpisy/.
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on interchange 
fees for card-based payment transactions, Brussels, July 2013. Available at: http://www.eur- 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0550:FIN:CS:PDF.
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action. This amount is usually defined as a percentage of the total value of 
the transaction carried out by means of a payment card5. 
It is possible to illustrate interchange fees and their classification within 
the system of fees for card-based transactions as shown in Figure no. 1. 
Figure no. 1 – Interchange fee. Source: HEŠNAUROVÁ, M.: Přeshraniční a zahraniční 
platební styk – workshop ČBA, September 2013 (Cross-border and foreign 
payments – CBA Workshop)
It is apparent from Figure no. 1 which depicts the so-called four-party 
scheme of relations in executing card-based payment transactions that card-
based  transactions  are  associated  with  several  fees  related  to  such  pay-
ments. First of all, cardholders pay fees to an issuer (often a bank) for issu-
ing a card or also for a transaction executed at retailers. The relevant fees 
are shown in the pricelist, which forms a part of contractual arrangements 
between a bank or another payment card issuer and a cardholder. The fees 
should reflect the costs associated with using the given payment card as 
well as the costs associated with fees paid to card associations for the pay-
ment card branding. 
Retailers that accept cards in respect of payments for goods and/or ser-
vices  pay commissions to the processing bank (usually one of the larger 
banks) determined as a percentage of the transaction amount. The commis-
5 Cf.  SCHLOSSBERGER,  O.,  HOZÁK,  L.:  Elektronické platební  prostředky,  BIVŠ.  Prague, 
2005. ISBN 978-80-7265-073-4 (“Electronic payment instruments”).
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sion level is set down in an agreement entered into by and between a retail-
er and between an acquirer. In general, such commissions range from 0.8 to 
7%, based on the retailer type and ability of the acquirer to negotiate the 
given commission. The commission reflects the costs of acquirer (processing 
bank)  associated  with  the  transaction  processing  as  well  as  the  costs 
charged by card associations, which authorized the bank – by means of a 
contract – to process the relevant transaction. 
Interchange fees  refer  to  fees  always paid  by an acquirer  (processing 
bank) to an issuer. The level of such fees should express the share in the rev-
enues for the transaction processing on the part of the acquirer. Very logical 
conclusion thus results from Figure no. 1 and from the characteristics of the 
fees: if the acquirer is identical with the issuer, then all fees paid by clients – 
as payment card users – accrue to the aforementioned bank, after the pay-
ment  of  fees  to  card associations.  Consequently,  the  settlement  of  inter-
change fees does not take place at all, as the acquirer is also the issuer. 
3. REASONS FOR REGULATING THE INTERCHANGE FEE 
LEVEL 
Therefore, what reasons have led the EC to its efforts for regulation of the 
fees, which have, so far, been agreed by individual entities (i.e. by the pro-
cessing bank/issuing bank) based on a contractual principle or determined 
in line with the card associations’ rules, as appropriate?  
One of the main reasons is the fact that it concerns mutually agreed in-
terchange fees, usually agreed between processing banks and issuers under 
a specific scheme. Processing banks charge such interchange fees to retail-
ers, who subsequently transfer them to consumers. Therefore, high inter-
change fees charged to retailers result in higher end prices of goods and ser-
vices paid by all consumers. Apparently, practical competition of individual 
payment card schemes is  predominantly aimed at convincing the highest 
possible number of payment service providers to issue cards under the giv-
en scheme, which – unlike the establishment of price discipline usually as-
sociated with competition in a market economy – generally increases the 
fees instead of reducing them.6 It is safe to say that - barring certain excep-
6 According to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, Brussels, July 2013. p. 2. Available 
at: http://www. eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2013:0550:FIN:CS:PDF.
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tions (e.g. Denmark) - interchange fees are currently not subject to any regu-
lation. 
The Proposal for a Regulation sets (Articles 3 and 4) the maximum levels 
of the fees charged for individual transactions carried out by means of con-
sumer payment cards – both in terms of cross-border payments and of do-
mestic payments – in the amount of up to 0.2% of the transaction value for  
debit  cards and up to 0.3% of the transaction value for credit  cards. The 
Regulation only foresees different force (in this case, the Regulation foresees 
the effect  –  author’s  note relating to the terminology of Czech laws)  for 
cross-border and domestic  transactions.  The implementation of the given 
interchange  fee  levels  under  cross-border  regulation  is  foreseen  to  take 
place within two months from the force of the Regulation, while the process 
should take place up to two years for domestic interchange fees. However, 
it is important to note the condition that the regulation only applies to trans-
actions executed by means of consumer payment cards. It is thus apparent 
from the aforementioned that interchange fees charged between the pro-
cessing bank and the issuer may differ from the foreseen regulated maxim-
um fee levels (in relative amounts) in case the so-called business (commer-
cial) payment cards, intended for legal entities or businesses, are used. 
4. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE INTERCHANGE FEE 
REGULATION 
Since it has been said that the regulation only applies to four-party payment 
schemes, we can assume that the interchange fee regulation may have cer-
tain positive impact in the following areas: 
On consumers; 
On retailers – or on the internal market as such; 
On market entry. 
Individual effects will now be analyzed in more detail. 
The  EC,  as  the  proposing  party,  relies  on  the  assumption  that  inter-
change fees charged for transactions between an acquirer and an issuer ulti-
mately increase prices for consumers. Moreover, the EC relies on the consid-
eration7 that retailers pay different fees to different acquirers for the pro-
cessing of their transactions; such fees are, among others, also affected by 
7 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, Brussels, July 2013. p. 3. 
Available  at:  http://www.  eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2013:0550:FIN:CS:PDF. 
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the interchange fee level. The introduction of regulation of the maximum in-
terchange fee levels should result in higher transparency of such fees, with 
positive effect on consumer prices. 
Moreover, the Explanatory Memorandum emphasizes that retailers are 
forced to pay different fee amounts to acquirers (processing banks) for the 
processing of card-based transactions, which are also significantly affected 
by various interchange fees charged to issuers. Furthermore, the EC relies 
on a relatively correct deliberation that interchange fees vary for individual 
retailers in one country, which certainly is true in reality. However, it is ne-
cessary to point out that consumers – as end customers – know the final 
prices,  not its individual components – i.e.  actual purchase price,  margin 
level, transaction fee amount, VAT amount or consumer tax (if any; taxes 
are shown separately in some countries, e.g. in the United States). There-
fore, the Proposal for a Regulation introduces one maximum level for inter-
change fees, thus consolidating the terms and conditions for all issuers/ac-
quirers within the Community. 
Another  area,  which  should benefit  from the  regulation,  is  the easier 
market entry into the segment of payment card issuing. Allegedly, accord-
ing to the statement of the EC that can be deduce from the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Regulation, the heterogeneous fee levels prevent mar-
ket entry. 
"The revenues for issuing payment service providers from the fees function as a  
minimum threshold to convince issuing payment service providers to issue pay-
ment cards or other payment instruments, such as online and mobile payment solu-
tions,  offered by new entrants.  Also,  market  entry for pan-European players re-
mains difficult, as domestic interchange fees in EU Member States vary widely and  
new entrants would have to offer interchange fees at least comparable to those pre-
vailing in each market they want to enter. This has an impact on the viability of  
their business model, inter alia affecting potential economies of scale and scope”8. 
However, the author believes that the considerations that lead the EC to 
introducing regulation in respect of the maximum fee levels for transactions 
executed by means of payment cards do not reflect the substance of the fee 
as such. Similar as interest represents the price of money, fees represent the 
8 Citation – see the Explanatory Memorandum to the Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, Brussels, July 
2013.  p.  4.  Available  at:  http://www.  eur-  lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2013:0550:FIN:CS:PDF.
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costs of providing a specific service, in this case a card transaction9. There-
fore, the fee level may, above all, significantly affect a payment card issuer, 
due to the fact that existing fees associated with the payment card issuing 
would not cover the costs of such service. It is necessary to understand that 
today, as part of competition, payment card issuers (namely debit card is-
suers) issue such cards without any fee for issuing, often not charging any 
transaction fees to end consumers either. Their business models rely on the 
collected  fees  received  from  processing  banks,  as  the  share  of  executed 
transactions. The current deliberations are as follows: in case an issuer does 
not issue a card, the transaction would not be executed by a consumer, i.e. a 
retailer would not sell the goods and the processing bank could not ensure 
the card transaction settlement. It is clear from the aforementioned that the 
issuer, too, takes part in the transaction. However, the issuer’s costs may 
vary and it may be the case (particularly in case of small payment card is-
suer) that the regulated commission reduces its revenues to an extent such 
issuer would be forced to suspend the payment card issuing due to the reg-
ulation of the maximum interchange fee levels. If the issuer is lucky, it will  
have to review its business model and start charging fees for the card issu-
ing/use, for example. The maximum interchange fee levels may have certain 
positive effects on issuers, particularly on cost reduction. But this aspect is 
not  applicable  all  the  time,  particularly  at  the  moment  of  market  entry, 
when costs  always exceed revenue.  However,  regulated interchange fees 
may significantly extend such period. 
Another entity that may be affected in an opposite manner than foreseen 
by the Regulation is the processing bank (acquirer). However, the author 
believes this bank has some advantage – it determines the total amount of 
the transaction processing fee. It is safe to assume that even if the acquirer’s  
costs in the form of the interchange fees charged for the benefit of an issuer  
decrease, the reduction does not have to be reflected in the reduction of the 
transaction processing fee, i.e. it does not have to be reflected in the price of 
goods and/or  services.  Consequently,  the  processing  bank’s  fees  will  in-
crease by the amount not charged to the card issuer, because the amount is 
limited by 0.2 or 0.3% (as appropriate) of the transaction amount. 
The author believes that a situation, where goods/services are cheaper if 
paid in cash and not by means of payment cards, is very unfortunate. This  
9 Cf., for example, POLOUČEK, S. et al.: Bankovnictví, C.H.Back. Prague, 2006. p. 3 et seq. 
ISBN 978-80-7179-462-7 (“Banking”). 
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was the case during a dispute of the MasterCard and the EC over the mean-
ingfulness  of  interchange  fees.  Furthermore,  Directive  2007/64/EC of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal 
market, which was transposed into Act no. 284/009 Coll., on System of pay-
ments, also includes a provision stating that merchant’s fees may be forwar-
ded to customers on condition they are informed about it in advance10. This 
practically means that retailers offer their goods cheaper in cash than if the 
goods are paid by means of payment cards. Therefore, rational consumers 
are likely to reach into their wallets and pay their purchase in cash. How-
ever,  banks essentially  refuse  such  development.  Cash processing opera-
tions are not operational and they are expensive and risky. 
The proposal for a Regulation has resulted in different opinions on the 
part of many experts and other competent persons. Advocates of the pro-
posal rely on various opinions supporting the idea that the interchange fees 
consolidation  will  result  in  a significant  progress  in  the consolidation  of 
payment services  in  Europe as well  as in  the limitation  of unreasonably 
high  fees  currently  prevailing  (e.g.  European Commissioner  for  Internal 
Market and Services Mr. Michel Barnier11). On the other hand, there is a re-
served approach that expresses concerns the new regulation would fail to 
contribute to the development of competition and innovations and that, ul-
timately, the efforts of the EC will turn not only against consumers, but also 
against retailers, since – in the end - banks will help each other. It is neces-
sary to underline the fact that the EC does not intend, for the time being, to 
regulate the fee agreed between the acquirer and the relevant retailer. 
Another factor not addressed by the proposal for a Regulation is the ap-
proach to payment transactions not executed by means of consumer pay-
ment cards. The Regulation proposal only states the following: 
“Commercial cards and cards issued by three party schemes, even though they  
tend to be more expensive, would not be covered – as proposed under option v - un-
der the various caps proposed for consumer cards...”12 
10 Cf. Section 92(2) of Act no. 284/2009 Coll., on System of payments. 
11 Material „Evropská regulace platebních služeb a její  dopady na ČR“, EU- Media, s. r.  o. 
Prague. 2013, p. 3 (“European Regulation of Payment Services and its Impact on the Czech 
Republic”). 
12 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, Brussels, July 2013. p. 13. 
Available  at:  http://www.  eur-  lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2013:0550:FIN:CS:PDF.
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The fact is  that the number of issued “commercial/business” payment 
cards is much lower and, consequently, the number of transactions is lower 
as well. However, average individual transactions may be higher (e.g. pur-
chases of air tickets, accommodation and meals during business trips, etc.). 
Are retailers – or their processing banks, as appropriate – going to distin-
guish  between  fees  for  the  processing  of  consumer  transactions  or  not? 
From the technological perspective, such differentiation would be possible 
based on the rules  for  determining the card number for  individual  card 
schemes (card associations – particularly VISA and MasterCard). The ques-
tion is; however, whether it is ultimately practical and, above all, effective. 
Especially processing banks will have to invest some funds in their card sys-
tems to ensure the situation that the regulation of cross-border transactions 
applies as of the third month after coming into force (effect) of the Regula-
tion. With regard to domestic transactions, it will be sufficient to implement 
the measures within two years. 
The Regulation proposal introduces other regulatory measures that sup-
plement the key objective of the Regulation – i.e. to regulate the interchange 
fees charged between banks for consumer payment cards. For the sake of 
comprehensibility of this paper, we should mention that the other efforts in 
the area of regulation are as follows: 
No territorial restrictions or special requirements in respect of obtaining 
a license for cross-border issuing and acquiring (processing) may be applied 
within the EU; 
Payment scheme (e.g. VISA or MasterCard) and processing must be leg-
ally and organizationally separate; 
Schemes must allow the authorization and clearing of a single transac-
tion by different processors; 
Co-badging of two or more different brands on a single payment instru-
ment must be allowed; 
Brand/application for the transaction execution is to be selected by a cli-
ent and may not be automatically preset; 
Agreement  with  retailer  must  comprise  a  commission  amount,  inter-
change fees, and fees paid to association for each category and brand; 
It is not possible to apply the retailer’s obligation to accept all cards of 
the given brand (only if identical IF), retailer must inform customers; 
Issuers  must  ensure  that  cards  are  visually  and electronically  distin-
guishable: brand, prepaid/debit/credit cards, and commercial cards. 
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What has the experience been with already implemented interchange fee 
regulation? For example, it  is  possible  to briefly summarize  available in-
formation from the USA13: 
Regulation of interchange fees for debit cards as of 1 October 2011; 
Interchange fees decreased by 50%; 
Absolute amount set down for the fees -  fixed amount - 27 cents.
The regulation had expected as well as some unexpected implications: 
Effect on issuers: 
Significant reduction of revenue on the part of issuers; 
Regulation does not apply to small issuers. 
Effect on retailers: 
Heterogeneous effects – interchange fees increased 2 to 3 times for retail-
ers with low transactions (≤ 15 USD); 
Higher prices; 
Card acceptance annulled; 
Court disputes in the area. 
Effect on consumers: 
Inconclusive price reductions at retailers; 
Card benefits  limited – bonus programs (50% of issuers  cancelled re-
wards in 2011 already); 
Account maintenance fees increased by 25%. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The EC takes all measures to ensure a single payment area within the EEA, 
as determined by the SEPA project some time ago. The proposed Regulation 
is certainly motivated by the effort to establish beneficial conditions for op-
erations of all entities involved in the execution of card-based transactions 
in the internal market. It may certainly contribute to the removal of some 
barriers in the single provision of payment services in general. However, 
the question is whether a regulation of prices or fees is the way to go. His-
torically, it continues to be the same “struggle” of two worlds – leave the 
developments up to the market mechanism, which will – itself - regulate the 
fees as part of competition and contest for customers, or proceed to “gov-
ernment interventions” (in this case represented by the EC), setting mandat-
ory prices or fee levels. However, neither way is positive for all market par-
13 HEŠNAUROVÁ, M.: Přeshraniční a zahraniční platební styk – CBA Workshop, September 
2013. p. 14 (“Cross-border and foreign payments”).
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ticipants – i.e.  consumers, retailers,  card issuers or card-based transaction 
processors in the case under review. Banks and payment scheme will  al-
ways oppose any measures that disadvantage them, limit their revenue or 
even result in their losses. The EC tries to protect consumers in several areas 
– in terms of the provision of loans, execution of payment services, insur-
ance of receivables from deposits, out-of-court settlements of disputes, etc. 
There are other areas as well. The question is; however, whether such “pro-
tective” measures  do not  turn against  the entities  being protected in  the 
long run. Consumers are then convinced that they do not have to worry 
about anything, because “others” will take care of them. 
The presented paper only partially addressed the analysis of expected ef-
fects and potential  implications  of the application of regulation within  a 
small part of the internal market of the European Union. As a long-term 
professional in the field, the author is rather concerned about positive out-
comes of the regulation. The results of the regulation in the United States 
only  confirm  the  conviction  that  the  interchange  fee  regulation  will  not 
bring the expected results and, ultimately, will not contribute to price re-
ductions at all. It is more likely that the effects will be opposite – increase in 
the prices of services associated with the payment card issuing/use, which 
may lead to more cash payments. And this absolutely inconsistent with the 
objectives of the SEPA project, also promoted by the EC14.
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